



Ubiquitous log odds: a common representation of probability and frequency distortion in perception, action, and cognition

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In decision from experience, the source of probability information affects how probability is distorted in the decision task. Understanding how and why probability is distorted is a key issue in understanding the peculiar character of experience-based decision. We consider how probability information is used not just in decision-making but also in a wide variety of cognitive, perceptual, and motor tasks. Very similar patterns of distortion of probability/frequency information have been found in visual frequency estimation, frequency estimation based on memory, signal detection theory, and in the use of probability information in decision-making under risk and uncertainty. We show that distortion of probability in all cases is well captured as linear transformations of the log odds of frequency and/or probability, a model with a slope parameter, and an intercept parameter. We then consider how *task* and *experience* influence these two parameters and the resulting distortion of probability. We review how the probability distortions change in systematic ways with task and report three experiments on frequency distortion where the distortions change systematically in the same task. We found that the slope of frequency distortions decreases with the sample size, which is echoed by findings in decision from experience. We review previous models of the representation of uncertainty and find that none can account for the empirical findings.



Keywords: log odds, subjective probability, probability distortion, frequency estimation, decision-making, uncertainty

Figure 1A (A..., 1953). A... E... **Figure 1A**... A... E... (G..., 1999; L..., 2000), (..., 1966; B... M..., 1977; ..., 1990), (A..., 1953; L..., 1978), (..., 2009, 2011).

Figure 1B... K..., 1992). D... (G..., 1999; L..., 2000). (B... M..., 1977; ..., 2009) 1... A... (1953)

(..., K..., 1992). G... (1999) fi... L ($\pi(p)$) = $\gamma L(p) + (1 - \gamma)L(p_0)$ (1) L (p) = $\frac{p}{1-p}$ (2) (B..., 1949) (B..., 1944).

Figure 2). γ E... 1... p_0 ... fi... P ... $p = p_0$... L ($\pi(p_0)$) = $\gamma L(p_0) + (1 - \gamma)L(p_0) = L(p_0)$. (3)



$L(p)$, $\pi(p_0) = p_0$. p_0 is the crossover point.

I Figure 2

$p \in [0, 1]$, $p_0 \in [0, 1]$, $\gamma \in [0, 1]$, $\pi(p) = p$.

$\gamma > 1 \implies 0 < p_0 < 1$

$0 < \gamma < 1 \implies 0 < p_0 < 1$

1966). I (G E , 1987; F , 1995; G , 1999). A

fi K (1979). A (A , 1953). F G (1999) LL (1998) LL (L , 2000). I J D fi LL p π fi (γ p0) - fi (R²) LL fi γ p0 LL ? γ p0? fi γ p0 C ? C fi γ p0 fi γ p0 (H , 2004; H , 2010). A / fi I A D H J D C I LL H J LL fi

UBIQUITOUS LOG ODDS IN HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION

J / fi LL γ p0 I fi γ p0 LL p0 B LL fi γ p0




FIGURE 3 | Linear in log odds fits: frequency estimates. The two data sets in Figures 1A,B are re-plotted on log odds scales as (A,B), respectively. The blue line is the best-fitting LLO fit. R^2 denotes the proportion of variance accounted by the fit. The S-shaped distortions of frequency/probability on linear scales in Figures 1A,B are well captured by the LLO fits.

FREQUENCY ESTIMATION

A (1953) ... I ... E (Figure 1A).
 LL fi 63% Figure 3A
 LL fi 77%

() 0.15. I
 $\hat{p}_0, 0.044$, A (1953) ... 1/26 (=0.039),

A L (1978).
 fl , 41 (M A). J

E (1000) ... M A (50000).
 ()
 (2.05×10^8) , p J

π . fi
 (. , fl

LL Figure 4A LL fi

I , (. , LL

(1990), LL

E (1990)
 Figure 4B LL fi

CONFIDENCE RATING

C fi
 , G (1991), fi ? () B ()
 A : 50, 51. 60, 61 70, 71 80, 81 90, 91 99, 100%
 fi 51. 60% 55%
 fi , C
 fi , π .
 , p, fi fi
 fi
 G (1991) Figure 6 Figure 5A. γ
 LL fi ()
 () . A

()
 G (1991) fi
 LL LL fi

M G (2004) fi
 Figure 5B.

DECISION UNDER RISK OR UNCERTAINTY

A (1979) K
 () J 2 ,

B fi (π)
 fi (p) I Figures 1B
 3B,

K (1992) LL fi 97%
 $\gamma = 0.60$ $p_0 = 0.40$.

A , G (1999)

I





FIGURE 4 | Linear in log odds fits: frequency estimates from memory or perception. Estimated relative frequency is plotted against true relative frequency on log odds scales and fitted by the LLO function. Black dots denote data. The blue line denotes the LLO fit. R^2 denotes the proportion of variance accounted by the fit. **(A)** Estimated frequency of lethal events from Lichtenstein et al. (1978). Participants were asked to estimate the number of occurrences of different causes of death per year in the US. The actual frequency of one cause was provided as a reference for participants to estimate the frequencies of the other causes. The relative estimated and actual frequencies in the plot were the frequencies divided by the

then US population. Left: when the frequency of Electrocutation (1000) was given as reference. Right: when the frequency of MVA (motor vehicle accident, 50000) was given as reference. **(B)** Estimated frequency of visual stimuli from Varey et al. (1990). The task was to estimate the relative frequency of black or white dots among a visual array of black and white dots. Two groups of participants respectively estimated the relative frequency of white dots (small p) and black dots (large p). Left: the white dots group ($p \leq 0.5$) was estimated. Right: the black dots group ($p \geq 0.5$) was estimated.

Figure 6A. E.

γ 0.17 0.82, 0.30.
 ρ_0 0.26 0.98,
 0.46.

F (1995)







FIGURE 6 | Linear in log odds fits: decision under risk or uncertainty.

Decision weight is plotted versus experimenter-stated probability (in decision under risk) or self-judged probability (in decision under uncertainty) and fitted by the LLO function. Black dots denote data. The blue line denotes the LLO fit. R^2 denotes the proportion of variance accounted by the fit. **(A)** Decision weights of individual participants from Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Each panel is for one participant. Participants chose between a two-outcome lottery and a sure reward. The probability of winning the larger reward of the lottery was stated as p . Decision weight, the counterpart of subjective probability π , was inferred from each participant's choices based on the Cumulative Prospect


Theory. Re-plotted from Figure 6 of Gonzalez and Wu (1999). **(B)** Decision weights from Tversky and Fox (1995). Participants chose between a lottery offering a probability of a reward or otherwise zero and a sure reward. The probability of winning the larger reward of the lottery p was stated (left panel), or estimated by participants themselves as the probability of a specific Super Bowl prospect (middle panel), or as the probability of a specific Dow-Jones prospect (right panel). Decision weight, the counterpart of subjective probability π , was inferred from participants' choices based on the Cumulative Prospect Theory Re-plotted respectively from Figures 7–9 of Tversky and Fox (1995).

1964; ... (1990) ... (1961; ... 1966; B ... M ... 1977). D ... (1964; ... 1966). E ... LL, ... γ : ... I E ... 1, ... E ... γ ... ρ_0 : experience (...) ... sample numerosity, N , ... 200, 300, 400, 500, ... 600.

Methods
Participants. E ... \$12/ ... C ... CAIH ... D
Apparatus and Stimuli. ... GDM-F 900 ... 24" C ... D



D 745
 (B , 1997; , 1997). A



Apparatus and stimuli. Experiment 1, ...

Procedure. ...

... \$12/ ...

... CAIH ...

... 1000 ...

... (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4) ...

... 0.02 ...

... 400, 500, 600, ...

... E ...

... × 96 = 480 ...

Results

... (2003; ... 2006) ...

... 1/m ...

... 1/m ...

... I ...

... 1/m ...

... fi ...

... (...) ...

... 0.06, 0.36 ...

... I ...

... fi ...

... 0.25, ...

... fi ...

... F ...

... ± 0.04 ...

... E . 1 ...




FIGURE 9 | Evidence for log odds as an inherent representation of uncertainty. Participants saw pairs of photos of faces. One group of participants rated the similarity between the two faces in each pair. A second group judged whether the two persons on each pair were related or not. **(A)** The similarity rating of two children faces is a linear transformation of the log

odds of the two children being judged to be related. Reproduced from Maloney and Dal Martello (2006). **(B)** The similarity rating of two adult faces is a linear transformation of the log odds of the two adults being judged to be related. Reproduced from DeBruine et al. (2009). R^2 denotes the proportion of variance accounted by the linear fit. See text for implications.

$F(10, 95) = 10.22 \pm 0.07$, $p = 0.42$. $M(1/4, 0.25) = 0.18 \pm 0.06$, lower $p_0 = 1/4$. $r = 0.29$.

Apparatus and stimuli. CAIH. \$12/.

Procedure. 1.5, 1. H. A E 1, (numerosity, N) 200, 300, 400, 500, 600.

EXPERIMENT 3: SLOPE AND DISCRIMINABILITY

K. (1992). G (1999). J. I E. 3, (J D) 0.5 fi. E 1. I. (0.0625, 0.05). J D.

J. J. $\pm 4\%$. fi. 0.5. F fi. 100, 500. E. 0.175, 0.1125, fi. F.

Methods

Participants. E 1 2. J D. A J. 0.56, 0.55,

Results

1- /2- 70.7% J D. F. fi. 0.57, 0.57, 0.56, 200, 300, 400, 500,

600. A f_i J D, $F(4,36) = 2.05, p = 0.11, \eta_p^2 = 0.18$. D E 1.

DISCUSSION

A J D, L H p_0 (LL, E . 1).

I E 1 γ I, $p_0 = 1/2$ (F, 2003; 2006), $1/m$.

Decisions from experience

(B E, 2003; H, 2004; H F, 2009; J, 2010), ? A f_i (L, 2000). (H, 2004; H F, 2009) J . C (2010), G () I LL, (), ().

E 1. A E . 4, f_i γ , $N = C$, J f_i

(1994) f_i (100 J) (10 J). 60% 9/100 J 1/10 p_0 (K, 1992; F, 1995; 1998). $m > 2$

Confidence ratings

G (G, 1991; G, 1994) f_i $\gamma > 1$ (Figure 5), $\gamma > 1$ I f_i

PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS OF PROBABILITY DISTORTION

? J (L, 1978) J (K, 1974). B (, 1991), f_i f_i I




Figure 5B).

DECISION UNDER RISK OR UNCERTAINTY

Adaptive probability theory

M. (2006) ...

fl ... B ... I ...

fl ... M ...

B ...

n, ... a, ...

b. B. M. (2006) ...

M. (2006) ...

\$100, ... 0.1 ...

B. ...

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Conflict of Interest Statement:

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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